周冰

• 1:北京大学法学院

• 
  

摘要(Abstract)：

待履行合同的继续履行对于破产企业的营运价值保护至关重要，但也造成了需要适当处理的特别利益冲突。《企业破产法》第十八条之规定对于待履行合同的继续履行进行了严格限制，形成了过度保护合同相对人的利益格局，也未能对其他无担保债权人提供应有的关注。在我国将来相关制度改良中，对于合同相对人的特别保护应仅限于债务人已违约与管理人转让合同两种情形，保护方式包括要求管理人采取违约补救措施与要求履约主体提供未来履行的充分保障。其他无担保债权人也可能因为管理人决策失当而利益受损，法院应当在涉及融资性合同或者在管理人存在利益冲突时，对继续履行的商业合理性进行实质审查。

关键词(KeyWords)：待履行合同;继续履行;破产财产;营运价值;《企业破产法》第十八条

基金项目(Foundation):

作者(Author):周冰

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• (1)鉴于待履行合同对于破产重整的意义最为显著,除特别说明外,本文以破产重整程序中的待履行合同为默认讨论对象。

• (2)See N.L.R.B.v.Bildisco & Bildisco,465 U.S.513,529 (1984).

• (3)参见安徽省合肥市中级人民法院(2019)皖01民初1425号民事判决书。

• (4)参见河南省灵宝市人民法院(2020)豫1282民初2261号民事判决书。

• (5)See In re Coors of North Miss.,Inc.,27 B.R.918 (Bankr.N.D.Miss.1983).

• (6)See In re Natco Industries,Inc.,54 B.R.436,440 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1985).

• (7)See Moac Mall Holdings LLC v.Transform Holdco LLC,143 S.Ct.927,598 U.S.(2023).

• (8)See Richmond Leasing Co.v.Capital Bank,NA,762 F.2d 1303 (5th Cir.1985).

• (9)参见浙江省嘉兴市秀洲区人民法院(2019)浙0411民初4607号民事判决书。

• (10)See In re Integrated Resources,Inc.,147 B.R.650,658 (S.D.N.Y.1992).

• (11)See In re Riodizio,Inc.,204 B.R.417,425 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1997).